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Jody W Forsyth*

Poison Pills:
Developing a Canadian
Regulatory and Judicial
Response

I. Introduction
It is trite to say that the United States has witnessed an explosion of
hostile take-over activity in recent years.' Potential acquirers have
employed both non-coercive techniques such as conditional bids2 and
proxy solicitations, 3 and coercive techniques such as "street sweeps' 4 and
two-tier, front-end loaded bids.5 In response, target corporations have
fought back with a wide variety of"defences designed to defeat any
undesired take-over attempt. One of the most widely contested of these
defences is the shareholder rights plan, or "poison pill" as it is better

known.
As with most corporate matters, the American experience with hostile
take-overs has spread to Canada. 6 The controversy surrounding the use of
the poison pill likewise found its way to Canada when, on October 3,
1988, Inco Limited became the first corporation in this country to adopt
a shareholder rights plan.

*LL.B., M.B.A. (Dalhousie); Associate, Bennett Jones Verchere, Calgary, Alberta. (The
original text of this article was submitted in August, 1989; however, quiet securities markets
since that time have resulted in few changes to the law that is the subject matter of this paper).
1. M. Baxter, "The Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of a Target Company in Resisting an
Unsolicited Takeover Bid" (1988), 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 63, at 63 & n. 2; L. Grafstein, "Whose
Company Is it Anyway?: Recent Developments in Canadian Takeover Law" (1988), 46 U. T.
Fac. L. Rev. 522, at 522 & n. 1; R. Micheletto, "The Poison Pill: A Pancea for the Hostile
Corporate Takeover" (1987), 21 J. Marshall L. Rev. 107, at 107 & n. 2.
2. A conditional bid is a take-over bid that the acquirer makes conditional upon its acquisition
of, inter alia, financing and regulatory approvals along with the removal of any defensive
mechanisms erected by the target.
3. A potential acquirer will attempt to solicit a number of proxies sufficient for it to control
a shareholder vote of the target corporation on either the acquirer's take-over bid or the
removal of the target's defensive mechanisms.
4. A "street sweep" occurs where the potential acquirer purchases a large number of the
target's shares in open market acquisitions. Street sweeps often occur immediately following a
failed take-over bid while a large number of shares are still in the hands of arbitrageurs.
5. A two-tier, front-end loaded bid is one in which the potential acquirer first makes a takeover bid for a bare majority of the shares of the target and, when successful, squeezes out the
remaining shareholders in a second-step merger for a consideration significantly less than that
given to those shareholders who tendered into the original bid.
6. Baxter, supr, note 1,at 63 & n.l.
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This paper will discuss the legal issues that arise from the use of poison
pills by corporations in Canada. Part II will provide a brief overview of
the structure of the most common forms of shareholder rights plans. Part
III will review the principles that have evolved in the United States
regarding the legality of both the adoption and maintenance of poison
pills. Finally, based on both the foregoing and a review of basic Canadian
securities and corporate law principles, Part IV will attempt to define
principles that Canadian judicial and regulatory bodies may and/or
should develop to govern both the adoption and maintenance of
shareholder rights plans.
II. The Various Forms
Although poison pills come in many different shapes and sizes, every pill
has the same fundamental characteristics. 7 Rights are first distributed to
all common shareholders of the corporation. The exercise price isset "out
of money" and the rights are subject to redemption at any time by the
target's directors for a nominal price. The rights are non-exercisable and
trade with and only with the common shares until triggered by an entity
(an "Acquiring Entity") through either its acquisition of, or its
announcement of a take-over bid for, a pre-set percentage of the target's
common shares. At this point, the rights trade separately and may be
exercised. The rights held by the Acquiring Entity are declared null and
void.
A "flip-over" rights plan provides that where the target amalgamates,
merges, or in any way combines with the Acquiring Entity, the rights
"flip-over" and entitle their holders to acquire a number of common
shares of the Acquiring Entity equal to twice the value of the exercise
price. Although this form of pill is effective against the two-tier, front-end
loaded take-over bid, it does little to prevent or deter an entity from either
"sweeping the street" or proceeding with a take-over bid for all of the
target's common shares.
To overcome this deficiency, the "flip-in" rights plan was developed.8
A "flip-in" rights plan provides that where an Acquiring Entity simply
exists, the rights "flip-in" and entitle their holders to acquire a number of
common shares of the target equal to twice the value of the exercise price.
7. See generally, D. Resenzveig, "Poison Pill Rights: Towavd a Two-Step Analysis of
Directors' Fidelity to Their Fiduciary Duties" (1988), 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 373, at 374-75;
M. Cohen, 'Poison Pils' as a Negotiating Tool: Seeking a Cease-Fire in the Corporate
Takeover Wars", [1987]Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 459, at 462-68; R.Micheletto, supra, note 1, at
112-19.
8. L. Herzel and R. Shepro, "The Changing Fortunes of Takeover Defences" (1987), 15 Sec.
Reg. L. J. 116, at 121-23.
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Finally, a "back-end" rights plan provides that, where an Acquiring
Entity merely exists, the rights entitle their holders to a package of debt
obligations of the target in an amount equal in value to the long-term
value of the corporation's common shares as determined by the directors.
Both the flip-over and flip-in rights plans render any take-over
economically prohibitive by diluting the Acquiring Entity's equity and
voting interest in the target. On the other hand, the back-end rights plan
is designed not to prevent a take-over, but rather to ensure that any such
offer is tendered at a price at least equal to the long-term value of the
target's common shares.
The heart of the poison pill lies in its redemption provisions. Although
the target's directors have no legal means of blocking a take-over bid, the
mere existence of the pill renders any take-over without the redemption
of the pill's rights economically prohibitive. Thus, a potential acquirer is
encouraged to negotiate a take-over that is acceptable to the target's
directors. Directors will/should reject any take-over bid which does not
constitute an offer of full and fair value to all of the target's shareholders.
It is at least arguable that the target's directors may also reject any takeover bid which, although constituting an offer of full and fair value, is not
in the best interests of stakeholders of the target other than its common
shareholders. 9
III. The American Experience
The validity of poison pills has been litigated in the United States for the
past several years. Opponents of shareholder rights plans have argued
that they are not consistent with federal securities regulations, that they
are invalid as a matter of corporate law on the grounds that they are
discriminatory and that, in both adopting and maintaining poison pills,
targets' directors have breached the fiduciary duties they owe to their
corporations.
1. SecuritiesLaw
The regulation of securities transactions in the United States is within
federal jurisdiction pursuant to its power to regulate interstate
commerce.10 Although the federal government has taken steps to regulate
corporate take-overs, many states believe that more restrictive regulation
is required and have hence proceeded to enact their own take-over

9. See infra., pp. 190-192.
10. US. ConsL, Art. I, s. 8,cl. 3 (the "Commerce Clause").
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legislation. Although many such statutes have been declared unconstitutional, some of the more recent ones have survived.
(i) Federal
Federal regulation of the take-over process was provided for in the
Williams Ac4 11 which added paragraphs 13(d) and (e) and paragraphs
14(d) through (f) to the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934.12 The intent of
the Williams Act is to protect shareholders by producing a take-over
environment in which they will receive full disclosure of terms of any
take-over bid, 13 by allowing any tendering shareholder to withdraw his/
her shares within seven days of a bid being sent to them, 14 by providing
that where a bid is for less than all of the common shares, and more
shares are tendered than were requested shares will be taken up on a pro
rata basis,15 and by providing that where increased consideration is
offered for shares during the course of a bid, the increased consideration
must be paid to all tendering shareholders, regardless of whether the
shares were tendered before or after the increased consideration was
offered.16,17

Perhaps the most interesting of all the provisions of the Williams Act
is paragraph 78n(e) which states that it is unlawful for any person "to
engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in
connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders
.... 18 Although it was argued that this provision gave the Securities and

Exchange Commission (the "SEC") the authority to regulate the
substantive fairness of both take-over bids and defences to take-over bids,
the United States Supreme Court held in Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc.19 that:
Nowhere in the legislative history is there the slightest suggestion that
[paragraph 78n(e)] serves any purpose other than disclosure, or that the
term "manipulative" should be read as an invitation to the courts to

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

15 U.S.C., Paras. 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1986) (the "WilliamsAct).
15 U.S.C., ss. 78a-78kk (1986) (the "SEA").
SEA, cl. 14(d) (1).
SEA, cl. 14(d) (5).
SEA, cl. 14(d) (6).
SEA, cl. 14(d) (7).

17. See generally M. Berman, "SEC Takeover Regulation Under the Williams Act" (1987),

62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 580; M. Steinberg, "Tender Offer Regulation: The Need for Reform"
(1988), 23 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1.
18. The term "tender offer" is the American equivalent of the Canadian term "take-over bid."
19. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
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oversee the substantive fairness
of tender offers; the quality of any offer is
20
a matter for the marketplace.
Thus, this provision comes into play only where there has been a
misrepresentation or non-disclosure. The scope of protection provided for
in the Williams Act is further limited by the narrow interpretation that
has been placed on the term "tender offer" by the United States Court of
Appeal.
First, in S.E.C. v. CarterHawley Hale Stores, Inc., 2 1 the SEC applied
for injunctive relief to prevent Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. from
repurchasing its own shares in the open market in an attempt to defeat a
take-over bid without complying with the disclosure requirements of the
Williams Act. The Ninth Circuit Court held that the proper test to
determine whether the repurchase was a "tender offer" within the
meaning of the Williams Act was the "Wellman eight factor test."
Pursuant to this test, only those offers that have the "overall effect of
pressuring shareholders into selling their stock" fall within the ambit of
the Act.22 While the Court recognized that
there certainly was shareholder pressure in this case, it was largely the
pressure of the marketplace and not the type of23untoward pressure the
tender offer regulations were designed to prohibit.
As a result, the application was dismissed. The result clearly implied
that "street sweeps" are not within the definition of a "tender offer" for
the purposes of the WilliamsAct
Second, in Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp.,24 Hanson Trust PLC
("Hanson") had made a cash take-over bid for any and all shares of SCM
Corporation ("SCM"). In the face of defensive actions by SCM, Hanson
terminated its bid and entered into five privately negotiated cash
purchases and one open market acquisition, acquiring a total of twentyfive percent of SCM's shares. SCM sought to prevent these purchases on
the grounds that Hanson had not complied with the disclosure
requirements of the Williams Act The Second Circuit Court rejected the
"Wellman eight factor test," stating that "the elevation of such a list to a
mandatory 'litmus test' appears to be both unwise and unnecessary. '25
However, it did adopt a test similar in tone to the approach used by the
Ninth Circuit Court in CarterHawley Hale in stating that stock purchases

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Ibid, at 11-12.
760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985).
Ibid, at 950.
Ibid, at 952.
774 F2d 47 (2nd Cir. 1985).
Ibid, at 57.
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fall within the meaning of a "tender offer" for the purposes of the
Williams Act only where "there will be substantial risk that solicitees will
lack information needed to make a careful considered appraisal of the
proposal put before them. '26 Since the solicitees in this case were "highly
sophisticated professionals," the Act's protection was not necessary and
the purchases were thus held to not constitute a "tender offer." 27
It is therefore apparent that federal securities regulation does little to
prevent or deter either coercive take-over techniques or defensive'
mechanisms. For this reason, some states have stepped in to fill a
perceived void.
(ii) State
Three different types of "second generation" state anti-take-over
statutes 28 have evolved. 29 First, "business combination" statutes provide
that where an entity acquires twenty percent or more of the target's
shares, it may not engage in any kind of corporate combination with the
target unless approval of such a combination is given by the target's
directors prior to the entity's share acquisition.3 0 Second, "fair price"
statutes provide that certain corporate combinations between an
acquiring entity and the target are prohibited unless they are approved by
eighty percent of all shareholders and a majority of disinterested
shareholders. This "supermajority" vote is not required where either twothirds of the directors approve of the combination or the shareholders
receive a "fair price" for their shares. 31 Finally, "control share acquisition
statutes" provide that where "control shares," normally defined to be
twenty percent or more of the target's common shares, are acquired in a
"control share acquisition," those shares retain their voting rights only
where the acquisition is approved by both a majority of both disinterested
32
shareholders and all shareholders.
26. ]bid
27. Ibid

28. "First generation" state anti-take-over statutes provided both enhanced disclosure
requirements and the ability of a state official not to allow a take-over bid to proceed where
he/she considered it to be inadequate. The statutes applied where ten percent of the targets
shares were held by state residents. Such statutes were held to be unconstitutional as a violation
of the Commerce Clause: Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). "Second generation"
state anti-take-over statutes attempt to circumvent the decision in MITE Corp. by requiring the
take-over bid to have a closer nexus to the state before the legislation will be applicable.
29. See generally, P. Hablutzel and D. Selmer, "Hostile Corporate Takeovers: History and
Overview" (1988), 8 N. Ill. U.L. Rev. 203, at 213-29.
30. See, e.g., N.Y Bus Corp.Law, s. 912 (1986).
31. See, e.g.,flinoisBusinessCorporationAc4 Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 32, para. 7.85 (1985).
32. See, e.g., Control Share Acquisition Chapter, Ind. Code Ann., s. 23-1-42 (1987) (the
"Indiana Anti-Take-over Statute").
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It is arguable that all .three of the above types of state anti-take-over
statutes are unconstitutional for either imposing a burden on interstate
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, or for being pre-empted
by the Williams Act in violation of the Supremacy Clause.33 The
constitutionality of only the control share acquisition statutes has been
definitely determined.
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,3 4 the United States
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Indiana AntiTake-over Statute. 35 The Court first stated that where compliance with
both federal and state law is possible, the state law will be pre-empted
only if it "frustrates the purposes of the federal law."' 36 It was then held
that as the Indiana Anti-Take-over Statute "protects the independent
shareholder against both of the contending parties,"3 7 it "furthers a basic
purpose of the Williams Act ' 38 and thus does not violate the Supremacy
Clause. 39 The Court next considered the Commerce Clause issue,
concluding that the statute does not discriminate against interstate
commerce because "lilt has the same effects on tender offers whether or
not the offeror is a domiciliary or resident of Indiana." 40 The Court also
rejected an argument that the statute violates the Commerce Clause by
subjecting a corporation to more than one set of regulations:
The Indiana [Anti-Take-over Statute] poses no such problem. So long as
each State relegates voting rights only in the corporation it has created,
each corporation will be subject to the law of only one State. No principle
of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State's
authority to regulate domestic corporations,
including the authority to
define the voting rights of shareholders. 41
Thus, the Indiana Anti-Take-over Statute was found to be
constitutional. While some argue that the plurality of approaches to the
substantive regulation of take-over legislation requires federal preemption with one consistent regime,4 2 it is apparent that until Congress

33. US. Const, Art. IV, cl.
2 (the "Supremacy Clause"). The Supremacy Clause provides that
federal law is the "Supreme Law of the Land," notwithstanding any state law to the contrary.
34. 107 S.Ct. 1637 (1987).
35. For a critical analysis of this decision, see M. Kapusta, "Tipping the Tender Balance: CTS
Gives New Life to State Takeover Law" (1988), 18 Stetson L Rev. 147.
36. CTS Corp.v. DynamicsCorp.ofAmerica, supra, note 34, at 1644.
37. Ibid, at 1645.
38. Ibid

39. !b ,at 1648.
40. Ibid, at 1648-49.
41. ]bid, at 1649.
42. E.g., T. Fiflis, "Of Lollipops and Law - A Proposal for a National Policy Concerning
Tender Offer Defenses" (1986), 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 303; But see Berman, supra, note 17.
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so acts, the state legislation shall remain. It is also apparent that the state
anti-take-over statutes do not attempt to limit the use of defensive
mechanisms; to the contrary, the statutes act as legislated forms of these
defensive mechanisms.
2. CorporateLaw
Shareholder rights plans must not only meet the strictures of both federal
and state securities laws, but must also be in compliance with the
corporate laws of the state of incorporation. Under this heading, most
state courts have focused their attention on an investigation of whether or
not directors have breached their fiduciary duties in either adopting or
maintaining poison pill defences. However, a proper analysis must first
43
consider the structural validity of such plans.
(i) Discrimination
Acquiring entities will often argue that a shareholder rights plan is ultra
vires the adopting corporation in that it unfairly discriminates between
holders of the same class of shares of the corporation. However, it is this
very discrimination that gives the pill its "poison."
To determine the validity of any particular distribution of voting rights
among holders of different classes or series of shares in a corporation, one
must first turn to the corporate legislation of the appropriate jurisdiction.
The problem here, however, is that one will rarely find a corporation
statute that explicitly allows or disallows discrimination between shares
or shareholders of the same class. As a result, two opposite lines of
authorities have developed on this point.
One line of authorities traces its origins to the Supreme Court of
Delaware's decision in Providenceand Worcester Co. v. Baker.44 In that
case, the Court was asked to determine the validity of an article in a
corporation's certificate which provided, inter alia,that each shareholder
was entitled to one vote for every common share owned by him/her not
exceeding fifty shares, and one vote for every twenty shares owned by
him/her more than fifty. The Delaware corporate law statute did not
provide an explicit answer as to the permissibility of this discrimination.45

43. M. Van Meter, "Share and Share Unalike: Judicial Response to Poison Pill Discrimination
Among Shareholders of the Same Class" (1987), 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1067, at 1072-73.
44. 378 A.2d 121 (1977).
45. DeL Code Ann. tit. 8, s. 151(a) provides that "Every corporation may issue 1 or more
classes of stock or 1 or more series of stock within any class thereof... and which classes or
series may have such voting powers, full or limited, or no voting powers... as shall be stated
and expressed in the certificate of incorporation .... "
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The Court drew a distinction between discrimination among
shareholders and discrimination among shares, concluding that the
former was permissible:
In the final analysis, these restrictions are limitations upon the voting rights
of the stockholder, not variation in the voting powers of the stock per se,
The voting power of the stock in the hands of a large stockholder is not
differentiated from all others in its class; it is the personal right of the
stockholder to exercise that power that is altered by the size of his holding.
In the hands of the smaller stockholders, unrestrained in the exercise of
their voting rights,46the same stock would have voting power equal to all
others in the class.
As a result, both flip-over/flip-in 47 and back-end48 plans have been
upheld by courts in a number of subsequent cases. It should be noted,
however, that no Delaware case has addressed the discrimination issue
49
specifically in relation to poison pills.
The opposite line of authorities is well illustrated by the decision of the
United States District Court in Amalgamated SugarCo. v. NL Industries,
Inc.50 In that case, NL Industries had adopted a flip-over/flip-in rights
plan. The New Jersey corporate law statute did not explicitly allow or
disallow discrimination among either shares or shareholders. 5 1 Although
factually similar to Providence and Worcester Co., the Court reached a
different result:
I find that the rights plan, and in particular the flip-in provision of that
plan ... is ultra vires as a matter of New Jersey Business Corporation law.
The flip-in effects a discrimination among shareholders of the same class
or series. 52

46. Supra, note 44, at 123.
47. E.g., CRTF Corp. v. FederatedDepartment Stores, Inc., 683 F Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
48. E.g., Revlo, Inc v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. S.C.
1986).
49. N. Nixon and P. Shoback, "The Reasonable Pill: A Primer for Directors and Their
Counsel on the Adoption and Use of a Shareholder Rights Plan" (1989), 1 De Paul B.L.J. 1,
at 18.
50. 644 R Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
51. N. J. StaL Ann, s. 14A:7-1(1) provides that "Each class and series [of sharesl may have
such designation and such relative voting, dividend, liquidation and other rights, preferences,
and limitations as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation .... "
52. Supra, note 50, at 1234. It is important to note, however, that the Court was also very
disturbed by the fact that the rights could no longer be redeemed to clear the way for a possible
take-over bid.
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Both flip-in 53 and back-end5 4 plans have been invalidated in
subsequent cases on the basis of discrimination.
This review of the cases demonstrates that it may be difficult to predict
if a U.S. court will invalidate either a flip-over/flip-in or back-end rights
plan on the basis of discrimination. One author notes that only Delaware
and those jurisdictions that rely on Delaware corporate law have upheld
discriminatory plans.55 However, even if all other states invalidate such
plans, the large number of Delaware corporations will ensure the survival
of the poison pill.
Assuming that a shareholder rights plan is not invalidated on the
grounds of discriminatibn, it must still be shown that the directors of a
target corporation have not breached their fiduciary duties in either
adopting or maintaining the rights plan.
(ii) FiduciaryDuties
Directors owe their corporations both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty
in the performance of their tasks. The burden of demonstrating a breach
of a fiduciary duty is placed on the party alleging the breach due to the
operation of the business judgement rule, which is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. 56
(a) DuO, of Care
A director's duty of care arises out of his/her obligation to act on an
informed basis. This has been interpreted to mean that in making a
business decision, a director must consider "all material information
reasonably available" to him/her.57 Thus, a breach of the duty of care
will result where directors act both swiftly and without adequate
information.58

53. E.g., RD. Smith & Co. v. Preway ne, 644 E Supp. 868 (WD.Wisc. 1986) (although in
that case the rights plan was not enjoined because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable
harm); Bank of New York Co. Inc v. IrvingBank Corp., 536 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y.S.C. 1988).
54. E.g., MinstarAcquiringCorp.v. AM, Inc, 621 E Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
55. Van Meter, supra,note 43, at 1093.
56. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. S.C. 1984).
57. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, at 872 (Del. S.C. 1985).
58. Ibid, at 874; See also Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc, 781 E2d 264, at
275 (2d Cir. 1986).
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The duty of care is concerned not so much with what actions directors
take, but with the way in which they are taken. To this end, the duty of
care imposes on directors desiring to either adopt or maintain a
shareholder rights plan a hurdle that is merely procedural in nature. So
long as all actions by the directors are properly "papered," no breach of
the duty of care should occur.
In the context of directors' fiduciary duties, a discussion of any and all
substantive hurdles that may exist to either the adoption or maintenance
of a shareholder rights plan has been discussed by the American courts
within the ambit of the duty of loyalty.
(b) Duty ofLoyalty
An investigation into the standard of conduct required of a director in
order to meet his/her fiduciary duty of loyalty to his/her company in the
context of a hostile take-over must begin with the decision of the
Supreme Court of Delaware in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.59 In
that case, Mesa Petroleum Co. ("Mesa") initiated a two-tier, front-end
loaded cash take-over bid for sixty-four million shares of Unocal Corp.'s
("Unocal's") outstanding stock at a price of U.S. $54 per share. This
number, together with the number of shares already held by Mesa, would
have been sufficient to give it control of Unocal. The back-end of the
transaction would have resulted in the exchange of the remaining
publicly held shares of Unocal for subordinated securities worth U.S. $54
per share. After meeting with both its financial and legal advisors,
Unocal's board of directors adopted a unanimous resolution rejecting
Mesa's tender offer as inadequate. At a subsequent meeting, after once
again receiving advice from its advisors, Unocal's board of directors
unanimously resolved to exchange forty-nine percent of its outstanding
shares for debt obligations worth U.S. $72 per share. The Unocal offer
excluded Mesa. Mesa promptly challenged the propriety of this
discriminatory defensive self-tender.
The Court first stated that a Delaware corporation may deal selectively
with its shareholders, provided that in so doing its directors do not breach
their fiduciary duties. 60 While it then went on to hold that the business
judgement rule applies in the context of a take-over, 61 the Court also
stated that:

59. 493 A.2d 946 (1985).
60. Ibid, at 953-54.
61. Ibid, at 954.
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Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily
in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial
examination at the threshold before the protections of the business
judgment rule may be conferred.
In the face of this inherent conflict directors must show that they had
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed because of another person's stock ownership.
However, they satisfy that burden "by showing good faith and reasonable
investigation.. .."

A further aspect is the element of balance. If a defensive measure is to
come within the ambit of the business judgement rule, it must be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed. (Footnotes omitted) 62
The Court then concluded that the actions of Unocal's directors,
confronted with a coercive take-over bid from a "corporate raider with
a national reputation as a 'greenmailer'," 63 satisfied the above tests and
that they were therefore protected by the business judgement rule. 64 As a
result, a preliminary injunction that was granted against Unocal was
vacated.
That the principles enunciated in Unocal are also applicable to
evaluate the standard of directoral conduct in relation to both the
adoption and maintenance of shareholder rights plans was confirmed by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v. Household Internadona
Inc.65 In that case, the board of directors of Household International, Inc.
("Household") adopted a flip-over rights plan prior to any announcement
of a take-over bid for the company's shares. Moran was both a director
of Household and chairman of Dyson-Kissner-Moran Corporation
("DKM"), Household's largest shareholder. DKM was interested in
conducting a leveraged buyout of Household and therefore challenged
the propriety of that company's poison pill.
The Court first noted that, unlike previous cases, the defensive
measures employed by Household's directors were not adopted in
response to any specific threat. However, it concluded that:
This distinguishing factor does not result in the Directors losing the
protection of the business judgment rule. To the contrary, pre-planning for
the contingency of a hostile takeover might reduce the risk that, under the
pressure of a takeover bid, management will fail to exercise reasonable
judgment. Therefore, in reviewing a pre-planned defensive mechanism it
seems even more appropriate to apply the business judgment rule.66
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Ibid, at 954-55.
bid, at 956.
Ibid, at 958.
500 A.2d 1346 (1985).
Ibid, at 1350.
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After finding that the directors were authorized to adopt the
shareholder rights plan, the Court then applied the three-prong test
outlined in Unocal to determine whether or not the directors would be
afforded the protection of the business judgment rule. First, the Court
found that the directors had acted in good faith in reacting to what they
"perceived to be the threat in the market place of coercive two-tier tender
offers." 67 Next, the Court held that the directors were reasonably
informed of the effects of the poison pill given that they received advice
from both their legal and financial advisors and that the plan was
critiqued before the board by Moran himself. 68 Finally, the Court
concluded that the rights plan was reasonable in relation to the threat
posed from the ever increasing frequency of coercive take-overs in the
financial services industry. 69
It is important to note that while the Court upheld the adoption of the
flip-over plan in Moran, it also cautioned that
that does not end the matter. The ultimate response to an actual takeover
bid must be judged by the Directors' actions at that time, and nothing we
say here relieves them of their basic fundamental duties to the corporation
and its stockholders
...Their use of the Plan will be evaluated when and
if the issue arises. 70
A liberal reading of Moranwould suggest that so long as coercive takeover tactics continue to be employed, and so long as directors properly
"paper" their transactions, the adoption of a shareholder rights plan will
not be invalidated as a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties. This
theory is supported by a long line of cases in which the adoption of flipover,7 1 flip-in 72 and back-end 73 rights plans have all been upheld. The
only noteworthy cases going against this trend are two decisions of the
United States Court of Appeal involving attempts by Dynamics

67. Ibid, at 1356.
68. Ibid
69. Ibid, at 1356-57.
70. Ibid, at 1357.
71. E.g., Horwitz v. Southwest ForestIndustries,Ina, 604 . Supp. 1130 (D.Nev. 1985).
72. E.g., Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners,652 F Supp. 829 (D.Minn. 1986); afl'g in part,
vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987); CRTF Corp. v. FederatedDep't Stores, Inc.,
supra,note 47; City CapitalAssociates Limited Partnershipv. IntercoInc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del.
Ch. 1988) appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. S.C. 1988); Mills Acquisition Co. v.
MacMillan, Inc., C.A. No. 10168 (Del. Ch.Oct. 17, 1988); rev'd in part, 559 A.2d 1261 (Del.
S.C. 1989); Grand MetropolitanPublicLtd v. Pillsbury Co., C.A. 10323 (Del. Ch.Dec. 16,
1988).
73. Supra, note 48.
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Corporation of America ("Dynamics") to take over CTS Corporation
("ICT8"I).74

On March 10, 1986, Dynamics made a take-over bid for one million
common shares of CTS, which, if successful, would have increased
Dynamics' ownership of CTS to twenty-seven and one-half percent. On
that same day and without consideration of the terms of the offer, CTS
announced that it was opposed to Dynamics' bid. The directors of CTS
proceeded to adopt a flip-in rights plan whose "poison" was released by
the acquisition of fifteen percent of the company's stock. At no time did
the directors discuss the fairness of the price contained in Dynamics' takeover bid. Dynamics moved to enjoin the rights plan and was successful
at the District Court level.75
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court, Posner C. J. affirmed the
District Court's decision. 76 He first noted the inherent conflicts of interest
experienced by directors in adopting measures designed to deter or
prevent take-overs and noted that
These problems have seemed serious enough to warrant a more searching
judicial review of corporate decisions concerning defensive measures to
takeovers than of decisions concerning ordinary business decisions.77
Posner was also deeply concerned that
The tender offer was not evaluated in a cool, dispassionate, and thorough
fashion .... [I]t is apparent that the insiders on the board, in particular the
chairman, decided from the start to block the tender
offer, before its
78
ramifications for shareholder welfare were considered.
The Court proceeded to affirm the District Court's decision on the
basis that CTS's directors had failed to consider the fairness of the takeover price79 and that the plan triggered at less than a majority
shareholding. 80 It concluded that the plan "effectively precludes a hostile
takeover, and thus allows management to take the shareholders hostage.
To buy CTS, you must buy out its management. "8 1

74. For a summary of these two decisions, see K. Crowder, "Recent Developments in the Use
of the Poison Pill Antitakeover Defense: Limiting the Business Judgement Rule" (1987), 31 St.
Louis U. L. J. 1083, at 1093-101.
75. DynamicsCorp. ofAmerica v. CTS Corp., 637 E Supp 406 (N.D. 1. 1986).
76. DynamicsCorp. ofAmerica v. CTS Corp., 794 E2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986) ("CTS I").
77. Ibid, at 256.
78. bM, at 257.
79. Ibid
80. Md, at 259. The Court noted that poison pills are often upheld as a mechanism designed
to protect minority shareholders from an inadequate second-step merger. Where the plan
triggers at less than a majority shareholding, such a justification isno longer valid.
81. Ibid
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As a result of the Court's decision, Dynamics' take-over bid was
successful. A committee of outside directors of CTS then recommended
that the board adopt a back-end plan that would trigger at a twenty-eight
percent holding of the company's common stock, an amount only onehalf of one percent above that then held by Dynamics. The plan would
cancel automatically where a cash take-over bid for all outstanding shares
was made at a price of U.S. $50 or more. The board adopted the plan
and once again Dynamics challenged the directors' actions in court. This
time, however, the District Court denied its motion.8 2 Dynamics
appealed.
Once again, the matter came before Posner C.J.83 He first reiterated
that
courts are not simply to rubber stamp the board's judgment but must
review it carefully to make sure that in adopting the poison pill the board
really was acting in the best interests of the corporation.8 4
Judge Posner then stated that in conducting that review
the court must consider the procedures leading
up to the adoption of the
85
poison pill and the terms of the poison pill.
In applying the above test, the Court first expressed concern regarding
the compensation of CTS's financial advisors, there being some thought
that they would receive an "incentive fee" if the company were sold to
a "white knight. '8 6 Second, the Court noted that there was in the
evidence no justification for setting the triggered ownership percentage
below fifty percent. 87 Finally, sufficient evidence was not found to
warrant the U.S. $50 per share cancellation provision, the Court noting
that "the pill cannot be upheld if the trigger price is an unreasonably high
sale price."8 8 On this basis, the case was remanded to the District Court
for further consideration.
The willingness of Judge Posner in both CTS I and CTS II to consider
the "procedures leading up to the adoption of the poison pill and the
terms of the poison pill itself" indicate that the United States Court of
Appeal adopted a significantly higher standard in relation to the adoption
of poison pills than the Delaware courts in assessing the directoral

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Dynamics Corp. ofAmerica v. CTS Corp., 638 R Supp. 802 (N.D. IM.1986).
Dynamics Corp. ofAmerica v. CTS Corp., 805 F 2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986) ("CMS II").
bid, at 708.
Ibid
Jbid, at710-11.
/bid,at 712.
bid, at 714.
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requirements of "good faith and reasonable investigation" as enunciated
in the Unocal case. However, the two cases may also be seen simply as
a reiteration of the duty of care test clothed in duty of loyalty language,
the result once again being that in adopting poison pills, directors must
properly "paper" their transactions.
Assuming that, in general, directors act upon reasonable grounds in
adoptingshareholder rights plans, it is important to remember that their
actions in relation to the maintenance of those plans must also meet the
three-prong test enunciated in UnocaL 89 This principle comes into play
where the directors refuse to redeem poison pill rights in the face of a
take-over bid.
This was exactly the situation before the court in GrandMetropolitan
Public Ltd v. Pillsbury Co.90 In that case, Grand Metropolitan Public
Ltd. ("Grand Met") sought an order directing Pillsbury Co. ("Pillsbury")
to redeem rights associated with its flip-in poison pill so that Grand Met
could proceed with a fully financed take-over bid for all common shares
of Pillsbury at a cash price of U.S. $63 per share. The sole basis on which
the directors refused to redeem the rights was the alleged inadequacy of
the offered price.
After stating that the case was governed by the principles enunciated
in Unocal the Court concluded that
Surely, Board action which bars Pillsbury shareholders from electing to
sell their stock ... when, (a) only shareholder interest is at stake ... is
harsh treatment of shareholders to whom fiduciary duties are owed. And
the means to accomplish that treatment, considered in context and result,
are Draconian.
In the principal, if not in all, Delaware cases validating use of the Pill,
it is apparent that the purpose thereof was to create a "defense" against
hostile, coercive acquisition techniques. 91
Given that the take-over bid was a cash offer for all of the common
shares of Pillsbury, there was no coercion involved and the directors were
therefore ordered to redeem the poison pill rights so that the take-over
bid might proceed.
It was noted in Pillsbury that the only interests at stake were those of
the shareholders. However, that may not always be the case, and where
other interests are affected by a take-over bid, it appears that such
interests may be taken into account by the directors. As stated by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal

89. See discussion ofMoran, supra,at pp. 169-171.
90. Supra, note 72.
91. kid, at 25-26.
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If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business
judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. This
entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its
effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of such concerns may include:
inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions
of illegality, the impact on "constituencies" other than shareholders (Le.,
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the
quality of the securities
being offered in the exchange. (Emphasis added)92
It is important to note that the above principle was modified by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holding,Inc.93 In that case, Pantry Pride, Inc. ("Pantry Pride") had made
a conditional take-over bid for Revlon, Inc.'s ("Revlon's") common
shares at a cash price of U.S. $56.25 per share. Revlon's directors instead
agreed to a leveraged buyout by Forstmann Little & Co. ("Forstmann")
because the latter was willing to support the face value of recently issued
Revlon notes. As part of that agreement, Revlon agreed to both a "lockup" option on two of its divisions and a "no-shop" provision. Pantry
Pride then challenged the Revlon-Forstmann agreement.
On appeal, the Court first found that the directors' decisions to both
adopt the back-end rights plan and issue certain note obligations were
protected by the business judgement rule pursuant to the principles
enunciated in UnocaL94 It then went on to state that when it became
apparent that the company was to be sold
[t]he directors' role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged 95with getting the best price for the stockholders at a
sale of the company.
The Court concluded that the directors had put the interests of the
noteholders before the interests of the shareholders and that, on the facts
of the case, this constituted a breach of their duty of loyalty. 96 The
directors had argued that, under the Unocal principles, they were
permitted to consider the effect of a take-over on constituencies other
than the shareholders. The Court rejected this argument, holding that:
A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to
the stockholders. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. However, such concern for
non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active

92. Supra,note 59, at 955.
93. Supra,note 48.

94. Ibid, at 180-81.
95. 1bid, at 182.
96. Ibid
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bidders isin progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the
corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder. 97
The reasoning of the Court in Revlon has been applied in several
subsequent cases.
In CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.,98 Federated
Department Stores, Inc. ("Federated") refused to redeem rights issued
pursuant to a flip-over/flip-in rights plan at a time when it was receiving
competing bids from both CRTF Corp. ("CRTF") and R. H. Macy &
Co. ("Macy's"). Federated subsequently agreed to redeem the rights with
respect of the Macy's bid, but did not afford the CRTF bid the same
treatment. However, Federated's directors did state that they were still
open to receive better bids from either CRTF or any other third party and
would consider redeeming the rights in relation to such a bid should it
materialize. CRTF claimed that Federated's directors had breached their
fiduciary duties under "auction" conditions, as defined in Revlon. In
refusing to grant injunctive relief, the Court concluded that in this fact
situation
We see nothing at this point that suggests that the Federated Board is
acting with any other motive than to enhance the bidding and to raise the
price for the benefit of the shareholders. Thus, we do not find that [CRTF]
has, at this stage of the record, demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
issue of the invalidity of the pill as applied in this situation, that is, on the
continued invocation of the Rights Plan vis-a-vis CRTF's present twotiered bid. 99
Different results were reached, however, in both Mills Acquisition Co.
v. MacMillan, Inc.100 and City CapitalAssociates Limited Partnershipv.
Interco Inc.10 1 In both cases there was an "auction" for the target
corporation that had in place a flip-in rights plan. In both cases a bidder
sought an order requiring the redemption of the target's rights so that the
target's shareholders could choose between, in the former case, one of
two take-over bids, and in the latter case, a take-over bid and a proposed
corporate restructuring. In both cases the order was granted.
In merging the principles applied in both Revlon and CRTF,the Court
in Interco held that
If [a determination that an offer is inadequate] is made in good faith..
it alone will justify leaving a poison pill in place, even in the setting of a

97. bid
98. Supn note 47.
99. bid, at441.
100. Supra, note 72.
101. Ibid

176 The Dalhousie Law Journal

noncoercive offer, for a period while the board exercises its good faith
business judgment to take such steps as it deems appropriate to protect and
advance shareholder interests in light of the significant development that
such an offer doubtless is. That action may entail negotiation on behalf of
shareholders with the offeror, the institution of a Revlon-style auction for
the Company, a recapitalization or restructuring designed as an alternative
to the offer, or other action.
Once that period had closed, and it is apparent that the board does not
intend to institute a Revlon-style auction, or to negotiate for an increase in
the unwanted offer, and that it has taken such time as it required in good
faith to arrange an alternative value-maximizing transaction, then, in most
instances, the legitimate role of the poison pill in the context of a
noncoercive offer will have been fully satisfied. The only function then left
for the pill at this end-stage is to preclude the shareholders from exercising
a judgment about their own interests that differs from0the
judgment of the
2
directors, who will have some interest in the question.
To summarize, the American position appears to be that, in most
instances, the directors' decision to adopt a poison pill will not be
questioned, so long as the transaction is properly "papered." However,
the directors' decision to not redeem rights 'issued pursuant to the
adoption of a poison pill in the face of a non-coercive take-over bid will
come under closer scrutiny. Where the directors have made a decision to
sell the corporation, they appear to be permitted to consider only the
interests of the shareholders. Furthermore, where such an "auction" has
come to an end, the directors must permit the shareholders to decide
which of two or more non-coercive alternatives is in their best interests.
IV. Developing a CanadianPosition
While many lessons may be learned from the American experience in the
regulation of the use of poison pills over the last several years, it is by no
means clear that the standards that have developed in that country should
be applied in Canada. Not only is the regulatory regime more restrictive
in Canada, but it is also suggested that philosophical differences in the
approach to the regulation of business in general dictate that a position on
the use of poison pills must be generated which is uniquely Canadian.
1. SecuritiesLaw
The regulation of take-over bids in Canada provides not only the same
protections as those afforded under the Williams Act in the United

102. Ibid, at 798.
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States, 103 but provides enhanced protection in two significant ways. First,
the definition of a "take-over bid '104 is more inclusive, thus protecting
shareholders against the discriminatory effects of "street sweeps." Second,

second-step mergers such as going private transactions are regulated, thus
providing enhanced shareholder protection against coercive two-tier,

front-end loaded bids. Of even more significance isthe fact that securities
regulators in Canada have recently taken steps to regulate defences to

take-over bids.
Take-over bids are regulated under both corporate law statutes105 and
securities law statutes. 0 6 A take-over bid is defined under the CBCA to

mean any offer to acquire shares that, if combined with shares already
owned by the offeror, would exceed ten percent of any class of issued
shares of an offeree corporation. 07 The OSA provision kicks in at an
ownership level of twenty percent and applies only where the offer is

made to a person or company in Ontario. 108 Both Acts exempt purchases
made through a recognized stock exchange. 109 In this regard, it should be

noted that the TSE regulates take-over bids in much the same manner as
do both the CBCA and the OSA.1 0 While the CBCA exempts offers

made to fewer than fifteen shareholders,'

"street sweeps" are effectively

prohibited because any purchase of more than five percent of the
outstanding shares of a class of shares within any twelve month period
falls within the take-over bid provisions of both the OSA112 and TSE.113
The regulatory regimes provide a period of at least twenty-one days

within which shareholders may deposit shares pursuant to a take-over

103. See Subsection IllI..i, supra, at p. 161.
104. A "tender offer" in terms of the language used in the context of the WfflliamsAct
105. E.g., CanadaBusiness CorporationsAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, as am. (the "CBCA"),
Part XVII (Take-over Bids), ss.
194-206. The CBCA is the model corporation law statute in
Canada and all future references to Canadian corporation statute law shall refer to the CBCA.
106. E.g., SecuritiesAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 466, as am. (the "OSA"), Part XIX (Takc-over Bids
and Issuer Bids), ss.88-100e. Due to the existence of The Toronto Stock Exchange (the
"TSE") within Ontario, the OSA is the prominent securities law statute in Canada and all
future references to Canadian securities statute law shall refer to the OSA.
107. CBCA, 194.
108. OSA, subs. 88(1).
109. CBCA, 194; CanadaBusiness CorporationsRegulations,SOR/79-316, as am., para. 58
(c); OSA, para. 92(1)(a).
110. The General By-law of The Toronto Stock Exchange ("TSE B/U'), Part XXIII (Stock
Exchange Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids).
111. CBCA, s. 194.
112. OSA, para. 92(I)(b). However, note that the OSA will exempt private purchases made
from five or fewer persons where the consideration paid does not exceed 115 percent of the
market price of the shares purchased, pursuant to para. 92(1)(c).
113. TSE B/L, subs. 23.14.
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bid." 4 These shares may be withdrawn at any time within twenty-one
days of the date of the bid. 115 Where the offeror increases the
consideration offered for the shares, such increased consideration must be
paid to all tendering shareholders.1 6 Where the bid is for less than all the
shares of any class and more shares are deposited than the offeror is
willing or bound to take up, shares must be taken by the offeror on a pro
rata basis." 7 Finally, both the offeror" 8 and the directors of the offeree
corporation" 19 must send to all shareholders of the offeree corporation to
whom the take-over bid applies a circular that contains sufficient
information and recommendations so that the shareholders may make an
informed decision with respect to the tendering of their shares.
To this extent, the Canadian regulatory regime mirrors that put in
place in the United States pursuant to the Williams Act. However, the
Canadian regime goes further and regulates offeror conduct subsequent
to a successful take-over bid to ensure that any subsequent appropriation
of minority shareholdings is achieved only for fair value. The Ontario
Securities Commission (the "OSC") has stated as its policy that:
Unless [the controllers already hold ninety percent or more of the
participating securities of the issuer], an issuer shall not carry out a going
private transaction unless ... the transaction obtains minority approval of
each class of affected securities in accordance with the following
provisions:
(a) If the consideration to be received by a holder of an affected security
of the particular class is, (i) payable wholly or partly other than in cash or
a right to receive cash within thirty-five days after the approval of the
going private transaction, or (ii) payable entirely in cash and is less in
amount than the per security value or the mid-point of the range of per
security values, arrived at by the valuation prepared in connection with the
going private transaction, then the approval shall be given by two-thirds of
the votes cast by the minority.
(b) In cases other than those referred to in clause (a) above, the
approval shall be given by a majority of the votes cast by the minority. 20
A "going private transaction" is defined to mean:
[A]n amalgamation, arrangement, consolidation or other transaction
proposed to be carried out by an insider of an issuer as a consequence of
which the interest of the holder of a participating security of the issuer in
114. CBCA, para. 197(c); OSA, s. 94.
115. CBCA, para. 197(a) (shares may be withdrawn at any time within 10 days of the date
of the bid); OSA, 94.
116. CBCA, para. 197(d); OSA, subs. 96(3).
117. CBCA, para. 196(l)(c); OSA, 94.
118. CBCA, subs. 198(1); OSA, subs. 97(1).
119. CBCA, subs. 201(1); OSA, subs. 98(1).
120. O.S.C. Policies, Section 9.1, II.B.I.
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that security may be terminated without the consent of that holder and
without the substitution therefor of an interest of equivalent value in a
participating security of the issuer or of a successor to the business of that
issuer or of another issuer that controls the issuer but does not include the
acquisition 12of participatory securities pursuant to a statutory right of
acquisition. '
The exemption from the definition of a "going private transaction" of
"an acquisition of participatory securities pursuant to a statutory right of
acquisition" ties in with the minority shareholder approval exemption
where "controllers already hold ninety percent or more of the
participating securities of the issuer" in that the offeror of a take-over bid
in which ninety percent of the shares held by entities other than the
offeror were acquired has a statutory right to acquire the remaining
shares held by such entities.' 22 Such entities may elect as consideration
for their shares either the same consideration as was paid for shares
acquired during the course of the take-over bid or the fair value of the
23
shares to be fixed by a court.1
In addition to the protection afforded under section 9.1, II.B.1 of the
OSC Policies, a minority shareholder subject to a second-step merger
1 24 and oppression, 25
may also take advantage of both the appraisal
remedies contained in the CBCA.
The appraisal remedy provides that where a corporation resolves to
1 26
amalgamate with another corporation (e.g. a squeeze-out transaction),
a shareholder is entitled "to be paid by the corporation the fair value of
the shares held by him .. ,"127 Where the corporation and shareholder
cannot agree as to what constitutes fair value, such a determination will
be made by a court. 28 The oppression remedy provides that where the
corporation's actions are either "oppressive or unfairly prejudicial" or
"unfairly disregard" the interest of any shareholder, then the court "may
1 29
make any interim or final order it thinks fit."'
It is clear that the Canadian regulatory regime effectively nullifies
most, if not all, of the coercive take-over techniques employed in the
United States. It is perhaps for this reason that securities regulators in this

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 910, as am. para. 164(1)(a).
CBCA, subs. 206(2).
CBCA, subs. 206(3)(c).
CBCA, s. 190.
CBCA, s. 241.
CBCA, para. 190(1)(c).
CBCA, subs. 190(3).
CBCA, subs. 190(15), (16).
CBCA, subs. 242(2), (3).
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country have recently pronounced National Policy No. 38 relating to
take-over bids and defensive tactics. Mr. Stanley Beck, in his role as
chairman of the OSC, summed up the thrust of the Policy in this way:
The Policy essentially takes the position that target directors have no role
other than advising the shareholders as to their opinion with respect to the
bid and seeking out alternative offers or higher bids. But it does not seek
to prohibit defensive tactics completely, other than placing restrictions on
those devices that deny to shareholders the opportunity to tender to the
bid: Rather, it allows the use of tactics to encourage an auction market.130
Thus, the securities regulators of this country have made their position
clear: It is shareholders who are to make the take-over decision. In this
regard, it should be noted that the OSC will permit the adoption of
poison pills only where such adoption has obtained or will obtain
shareholder approval. 131,132 A similar view is also held by the TSE133
It is equally clear that the OSC has available to it a wide range of
discretionary remedies through which it may enforce its views. First, the
Commission has the ability to prohibit the issuance of either the poison
pill rights or the securities exchanged for those rights upon the triggering
of the pill. 134 Second, even should the Commission not prohibit the
issuance of the rights, it could nullify the effect of the issuance by
requiring the filing of both a preliminary prospectus and a prospectus. 135, 136 Finally, even should the rights plan go forward, the

130. S. Beck and R. Wildeboer, "National Policy 38 as a Regulator of Defensive Tactics",
[1987] MeredithMemorialLectures119, at 131.
131. D. Westell, "OSC makes it clear it wants shareholders to approve poison pills", The
Globe and Mail February 9, 1989, at B14.
132. This is in line with National Policy No. 38, para. 3 which provides that while the
administrators are concerned with company tactics that may abuse shareholder rights, "Prior
shareholder approval of corporate action would, in appropriate cases, allay such concerns."
133. J. McNish, "Shareholders to get say on Pegasus plan", The Globe andMai December
13, 1988, at BI.
134. Pursuant to TSE B/L, Part XIX (Listed Companies), s. 19.06, the TSE has the authority
to reject notice of a proposed issuance of securities. The OSC's power to oversee such a
decision is derived from OSA, para. 22(2)(c) which provides that "The Commission may,
where it appears to it to be in the public interest, make any decision, with respect to any bylaw, ruling, instructions, or regulation of any such stock exchange."
135. This, of course, first assumes that the issuance of the rights would constitute a
"distribution" under the OSA. The prospectus exemption available for a rights issuance under
OSA, subpara. 71(l)(h)(i) is available only where "the Commission has not informed the
issuer in writing within ten days of the giving of the notice [of the conditions of the issuance]
that it objects to the proposed trade."
136. If the poison pill was adopted in the face of an actual or imminent bid, time would be
of the essence, and the delay caused by the requirement to file and receive receipts for both a
preliminary prospectus and a prospectus would in all likelihood allow the take-over bid to
reach the point of fruition before the rights plan could take effect.
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Commission could at any time, in its discretion, order that all trading in
137
the rights is to cease.
The decision in Re Canadian Tire Corp.138 serves as evidence of the
judiciary's reluctance to interfere with the OSC's exercise of its
discretionary remedies. In that case, the Commission issued a cease
trading order to restrain take-over bid for forty-nine percent of the
common shares of Canadian Tire Corporation ("CTC"). Although there
had been no breach of the OSA, the regulations thereunder or of the
policies of the Commission, the OSC found that the bid circumvented the
operation of certain take-over bid protections that were applicable to the
Class A non-voting shares of CTC and for that reason was in
1 39
contravention of the public interest.
The Ontario Divisional Court refused to interfere with the OSC's
order, stating that:
Out of respect for the expertise of the Commission, for the weight of the
responsibility it bears, and for the stature it has achieved in the industry it
the view
is called upon to regulate, the Courts have repeatedly
40 expressed
that its actions should not lightly be interfered with. 1
It is therefore clear that the securities regulators in this country have
the ability to enforce their view that only shareholders are entitled to
make the take-over decision. While securities regulation is to be preferred
to judicial action in a take-over dispute given both the regulators'
expertise and ability to respond quickly, it is suggested that, in
maintaining their position, securities regulators are acting contrary to an
interpretation of judicial precedent that it is, in fact, the directors who
141
If
have the right to make the take-over decision in this country.
subsequent case law should prove this interpretation to be correct, it is
further suggested that any action on the part of the OSC to prevent the
adoption or maintenance of a shareholder rights plan on the basis that it
prevents shareholders from making the take-over decision is an improper
exercise of its discretion.
2. CorporateLaw
It is expected that shareholder rights plans will raise the same corporate
law issues in Canada as they have raised in the United States. To this end,
137. OSA, subs. 123(1) provides that "The Commission may, where in its opinion such action
is in the public interest, order, subject to such terms and conditions as it may impose, that
trading shall cease in respect of any securities for such a period as is specified in the order."
138. (1987), 35 B.L.R. 56 (O.S.C.); aff'd (1987) 35 B.L.R. 117 (Ont. Div. CL).

139. id, at 126.
140. bi, at 131.
141. This is a point which iselaborated upon in infra, at pp. 190-192.
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poison pills must prove first to be structurally valid, and second, to not
result in the breach of fiduciary duties of those directors that choose to
either adopt or maintain such plans. In addition, the adoption or
maintenance of a poison pill must not effect a result that is oppressive to
the adopting corporation's shareholders.
(i) Discrimination
A review of American authorities1 42 revealed that courts in the United
States are divided on the issue of whether shareholder rights plans are
invalid due to the discrimination that is created among shareholders. The
courts that have upheld poison pills have reasoned that state corporate
legislation prohibits only discrimination among shares. Rights plans, they
maintain, discriminate among shareholders and not among shares per se.
The starting point of an investigation into the probable Canadian
position on this issue must begin with a consideration of the corporate
legislation. Section 24 of the CBCA provides, in part, that:
24(3) - Where a corporation has only one class of shares, the rights of
the holders thereof are equal in all respects...;
24(4) - The articles may provide for more than one class of shares
and, if they so provide, (a) the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions
attaching to the shares of each class shall be set out therein...
Subsection 24(4) is very similar to provisions of both the Delaware 43
and New Jersey' 44 corporate law statutes discussed in subsection III.2.i
above in that it does not explicitly state whether discrimination among
either shares or shareholders is permitted where there is more than one
class of shares. Where there is but one class of shares, however,
subsection 24(3) of the CBCA makes it perfectly clear that such
discrimination is not permissible in stating that the "rights of the holders"
of such shares are equal in all respects.
The effect of subsection 24(3) was considered in Jacobsen v. United
Canso Oil & GasLtd 145 In that case, the plaintiff shareholder challenged
one of the defendant's corporate by-laws which stated that no person was
entitled to vote more than one thousand shares of the defendant company
notwithstanding the number of shares actually held. As the defendant
corporation had but one class of shares, subsection 24(3) was applicable
and the Court concluded that the by-law was invalid.

142. See supra,at pp. 165-167.

143. Supra note 45.
144. Supra,note 51.
145. (1980), 113 D.L.R. (3d) 427 (Alta. Q.B.).
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The reasoning of the Court in United Canso led the drafters of
Alberta's Business CorporationsAct (the "ABCA"), 146 which is based on
the CBCA, to incorporate an additional subsection into its section 24.
Subsection 24(5) of the ABCA therefore provides that:
24(5) - Subject to section 27, if a corporation has more than one class
of shares, the rights of the holders of the shares of any class are equal in
all respects.
Section 27 of the ABCA permits different rights to attach to different
series of shares within the same class.
The drafters of the ABCA gave the following reasons for the addition
of subsection 24(5):
Mr. Justice Forsyth's decision [in United Canso] however, insofar as it
relates to the CBCA, is founded entirely upon CBCA s. 24(3) which
applies only "if a corporation has only one class of shares". The judge did
not expressly say so, but it appears that if the corporation before him had
had more than one class of shares, his decision might have been different.
In the present state of CBCA s. 24, it is easy to see why the judge might
hold that view, as CBCA s. 24(4) which allows the articles to provide for
more than one class, does not say that the shares of a class are equal.
However, while the CBCA draws a distinction between a corporation
having one class of shares and a corporation having more than one class,
we do not think that that distinction is based upon any policy
considerations. It appears to us that the relationship of United Canso's
common shareholders among themselves should be the same whether or
not the corporation had issued another class of shares. S. 25(5) of the draft
Act would therefore apply to corporations having more than one class of
shares 147
the rule that the rights of the holders of the shares of a class are
equal.
If the drafters of the AECA are correct, it would therefore appear that
while discrimination among shares or shareholders in a corporation that
has more than one class of shares would not be permissible for policy
reasons, the actual wording of the CBCA may allow for this eventuality.
Fortunately, the Ontario Court of Appeal has spoken directly to this
issue.
In Bowater Canadian Ltd v. R. L. Crain Inc.,148 the plaintiff
shareholder challenged the validity of a "step-down" provision which
entitled the original holder of a share to ten votes per share but entitled
any transferee to only one vote per share. As the defendant corporation

146. S.A. 1981, c. B-15.
147. Institute of Law Research and Reform, Proposals For a New Alberta Business
CorporationsAc Vol. 1: Report (August, 1980), at 75.
148. (1987), 62 O.R. (2d) 752 (C.A.).
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had more than one class of shares, the interpretation of subsection 24(4)
of the CBCA was called into question. The Ontario Court of Appeal
agreed with the trial judge that
although there was not express prohibition in the CBCA against a stepdown provision, s. 24(4) of the Act should be interpreted in accordance
with the general principles of corporation law with the result that the
rights which are attached to a class of shares must be provided equally to
all shares of that class, this interpretation being founded on the principle
that rights, 49including votes, attach to the share and not to the
1
shareholder.
On this basis, the Court then explicitly adopted subsection 24(5) of the
ABCA as expressing the "applicable principle of corporate law." 150
On the basis of both the wording of subsection 24(5) of the ABCA and
the above case law, it may be concluded that discrimination among either
shares or shareholders of corporations having more than one class of
shares is probably not permissible in Canada. However, this does not end
the matter.
In seeking to uphold the validity of poison pills, it may first be argued
that any possible discrimination among shareholders does not occur until
an Acquiring Entity actually exists. That is, until the pill is triggered, no
discrimination exists. Thus, adoption of poison pills would not be
discriminatory; only the subsequent maintenance of pills would give rise
to any such problem. The weakness in this argument may be seen by
analogy to an argument that discrimination in dividend rights does not
occur until a dividend is actually declared. Such an argument would
obviously not succeed as such discrimination would be declared invalid
at any time.
A more persuasive argument in favour of the validity of shareholder
rights plans is that they do not discriminate among shareholders but
among rightholders, and that the latter form of discrimination is
permissible under the CBCA. Although it may be countered that the
shareholder/rightholder distinction is not a valid one in the case of a
poison pill given that the rights are initially issued to all shareholders and
trade with and only with the shares until the pill is triggered, the fact still
remains that any discrimination that may exist between shareholders
exists in their rights qua rightholder, and not their rights qua shareholder.
The provision of the CBCA that governs the issuance of rights is
section 29, which states, in part, that:

149. Ibid, at 754.
150. Ibid, at 755.
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29(1) - A corporation may issue certificates, warrants or other
evidences of conversion privileges, options or rights to acquire securities of
the corporation, and shall set out the conditions thereof (a) in the
certificates, warrants or other evidences; or (b) in certificates evidencing
the securities to which the conversion privileges, options or rights are
attached.

Given that the CBCA does not prohibit discrimination among
rightholders, it may be argued that such discrimination is permissible
given that rightholder rights then become determinable solely under the
contract between the issuer of the rights, the trustee for the rights plan and
the holder of the rights.
A court may have an aversion to such an argument given that this
15 1
simply allows a corporation to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.
A court may also accede to an argument that the fundamental principle
of shareholder equality should be extended to encompass all security
holders of a corporation (Le., as a matter of common law, there should
exist right/rightholder equality). However, such reasoning could be
further countered with an argument that there is a fundamental difference
between the nature of a right and that of a share. A rightholder has not
risked capital in the corporation and should, therefore, not be afforded a
high degree of statutory protection. This protection should not be granted
until the holder exercises his/her rights, makes a contribution of capital
to the corporation and receives shares in return.
Regardless of the merits of any of the above arguments, it is suggested
that the validity of shareholder rights plans should not be determined on
such a technical basis. The underlying purpose of equality is to protect
shareholder interests. It would be ironic indeed if, in the name of such
protection, a defensive mechanism, one of whose primary purposes is to
protect shareholder interests, was invalidated. It is suggested that the
propriety of shareholder rights plans is better analysed under corporate
law principles relating to the fiduciary duties of corporate directors.
(ii) Oppression
Subsection 241(2) of the CBCA provides that:
If, ... the court is satisfied that in respect of a corporation or any of its

affiliates
(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects

a result,
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or
have been carried on or conducted in a manner, or
151. G. Coleman, "Poison Pills in Canada" (1989), 15 C.B.L.J. 1,at 10.
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(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates
are or have been exercised in a manner
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the
interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the court may
make an order to rectify the matters complained of.
The oppression remedy could operate in two ways with respect to a
shareholder rights plan. 152 First, it may be argued that a pill oppresses
existing shareholders of the target corporation in that it discourages
potential bids for their shares. Second, it may be argued that a pill
oppresses an Acquiring Entity in that it discourages it from making a
potential bid for the target corporation's shares and that, upon triggering
of the pill, the Acquiring Entity's rights are voided with resulting punitive
dilution to its interest in the target corporation.
With respect to the availability of an oppression remedy on behalf of
existing shareholders of the target corporation, an argument may be made
that no such remedy is available where there exists no Acquiring Entity
in that there is no interest that is being presently oppressed. 53 The
availability of an oppression remedy where an Acquiring Entity does
exist will depend in large measure upon the court's view of the evidence
relating to the propriety of poison pills. This is, of course, an issue of great
debate and is well beyond the scope of this paper.
With respect to the availability of an oppression remedy on behalf of
an Acquiring Entity, it may be argued that only its interests as a
shareholder are protected and that therefore no remedy is available on
the basis that it is discouraged from making a bid for the target
corporation's shares. This reasoning was adopted by the court in Stone v.
Stonehurst EnterprisesLtd 154 In that case, shareholders of Stonehurst
Enterprises Ltd. received two offers to purchase the assets of the
corporation, one offer for $325,000 and a second offer from the minority
shareholder for $330,000. The majority shareholder voted to accept the
lesser offer. The minority shareholder applied to have the contract of sale
set aside, claiming that the acceptance of the lesser offer was oppressive.
In dismissing the application, Landry J. noted that:
It must be remembered, and it is very important in this case, that it is only
the interest of a shareholder as such, or of a director or officer as such that
is protected by [the oppression remedy] section.

152. bid, at 9.
153. See, e.g., Michalak v. Biotech ElectronicsLtd (1986), 35 B.L.R. 1 (Que. Sup. Ct.); Bank
ofMontreal v. Dome PetroleumLtd (1987), 54 Alta. L.R. (2d) 289 (Q.B.).
154. (1987), 80 N.B.R. (2d) 290 (Q.B.).
155. Ibid. at 305.
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The applicant must establish that his interest as a shareholderhas been
affected. He may of course have other interests, such as being a prospective
purchaser of the assets of the company. But it is only the applicant's
interest as a shareholder which we must be concerned with in applying
[the oppression remedy section].1 55

This same reasoning supports an argument that no oppression remedy
on behalf of an Acquiring Entity is available on the basis that, upon
triggering of the pill, its rights are voided with resulting punitive dilution
to its interest in the target corporation in that it is only the Acquiring
Entity's interest as a rightholder that is thereby affected and a rightholder
156
is not protected under section 241 of the CBCA.
Regardless of an Acquiring Entity's entitlement to an oppression
remedy on its own behalf, it may always attempt to bring an application
for an oppression remedy on behalf of the existing shareholders of the
157
target corporation.
(iii) FiduciaryDuties

The common law has always provided that directors owe their
corporations both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. These duties have
now been statutorily mandated under subsection 122(1) of the CBCA,
which provides that
122(1) - Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising his
powers and discharging his duties shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
corporation; and
(b)

exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person

would in comparable circumstances.
Although the degree to which these duties may dictate the ability of
directors to either adopt or maintain a shareholder rights plan has never
been tested in Canada, there is sufficient jurisprudence to provide a
foundation for such an analysis.
(a) Duty of Care

Liability for a breach of duty of care has rarely been imposed upon
directors at common law, primarily due to the lack of directoral
156. CBCA, subs. 241 (2) protects "security holders.' CBCA, subs. 2(1) defines a "security"
to mean "a share of any class or series of shares or a debt obligation of a corporation and
includes a certificate evidencing such a share or debt obligation." Therefore, a rightholder isnot
a "security holder."
157. The Acquiring Entity could argue that it is a "proper person" to bring an application for
an oppression remedy on behalf of existing shareholders pursuant to the definition of
"complainant" contained in CBCA, s. 238.
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qualifying standards and the fact that, by the very nature of their office,
directors are called upon to exercise judgement which is very difficult to
objectively assess. 158
While the statutory phrasing of the duty arguably raises the standard
of care required of directors at common law,1 59 it is suggested that, as in
the United States, the duty of care imposes merely procedural checks on
directoral conduct leading to either the adoption or maintenance of a
shareholder rights plan and that all substantive hurdles in this context
arise within the ambit of the directors' duty of loyalty.
(b) Duty ofLoyalty
Most of the English and Canadian cases that consider the nature of
directors' duty of loyalty have involved situations in which the directors
of a target corporation have been issued shares in an attempt to deter or
prevent a particular entity from gaining control of the corporation. From
the early cases, two distinct tests evolved.
The first test focused on the subjective intent of the directors. As stated
in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd, 160 directors ... must exercise their
discretion bona fide in what they consider - not what a court may
consider - to be in the best interests of the company, and not for any
collateral purpose." 161 The second test focused on whether or not the
actions of the directors were within the "proper purpose" for which their
power to act was granted. Therefore, even where the directors acted in
good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation, a share
issuance would be set aside where its primary purpose was to ensure
control by the directors and not to raise additional capital for the
162
corporation.
Both of the above tests were considered in the seminal case of Teck
Corp. v. Millar.163 In that case, Afton Mines Ltd. ("Afton") owned a
resource property which it desired to have developed by an outside
entity. Teck Corporation Ltd. ("Teck") was interested in developing the
property and acquired shares in Afton, sufficient in number to give it
control. The directors of Afton determined that it was in the best interests
of the corporation to have the property developed by Canex Exploration
158. B.Welling, CorporateLaw in Canada-The GoverningPrinciples(Toronto: Butterworths,
1984), at 328-31.
159. Directoral conduct will now be measured against the actions that a "reasonably prudent
person would exercise in comparable circumstances". See supra, at pp. 187.
160. [1942] Ch. 304.
161. bid, at306.
162. Hoggv. CramphornLtd, [1967] 1 Ch. 254.
163. [1973] 2 W.W.R. 385 (B.C.S.C.).
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Inc. ("Canex") and thus proceeded to enter into a development contract
with Canex, a term of which gave Canex an option to acquire thirty
percent of Afton's voting shares. Such an acquisition would have
destroyed Teck's majority and therefore have prevented it from acquiring
the contract for itself. Action was brought against the directors of Afton,
claiming, inter alia,that they had exercised their share issuance power for
an improper purpose.
Writing for the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Berger J. first
noted the inconsistency between the two tests outlined above:
[I]f Hogg v. Cramphornis right, directors may not allot shares to frustrate
an attempt to obtain control of the company, even if they believe that it
is in the best interests of the company to do so. This is inconsistent with
the law as laid down in Re Smith &FawcetL 64
He then went on to reject the approach followed in the Hogg case and
stated:
I think the courts should apply the general rule in this way: The directors
must act in good faith. Then there must be reasonable grounds for their
belief.... If there are not, that will justify a finding that the directors were
65
actuated by an improper purpose.
The Court concluded that the directors had reasonable grounds for
believing that it was in the best interests of the corporation to have its
property developed by Canex and that, therefore, the directors had not
breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to Afton.
The approach in Teck has been followed by both the Ontario High
Court 166 and the Manitoba Court of Appeal. 67 However, the approach
in Hogg continues to be followed in England, 168 and was also recently
adopted by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court.1 69 It is clear, therefore, that
the issue has not been definitively resolved in this country.
It is suggested that the approach of Mr. Justice Berger in Teck is to be
preferred to that followed in applying the "proper purpose" test.1 70 First,
it must be noted that the share issuance power under the CBCA is not a
limited one.' 71 Therefore, any judicial statement that directors issued

164. Ibid, at410.
165./Aid, at 414.
166. First City FinancialCorp. Ltd v. Genstar Corp. (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 631, at 646; Re
Olympia & York EnterprisesLtd andHiram Walker (1986), 59 O.R. (2d) 254, at 270-73.
167. Olson v. PhoenixIndustrialSupply Ltd (1984), 26 B.L.R. 183.
168. E.g., HowardSmith Ltd v.Ampol PetroleumLtd, [1974] 2 WL.R. 689 (P.C.).
169. Exco Corp. v. Nova Scotia Savings &Loan Co. (1987), 35 B.L.R. 149.
170. See Baxter, supra note 1,at 86-88; B. Welling, supra,note 158, at 341-51.
171. CBCA, subs. 25(i) states that "shares may be issued at such times and to such persons
and for such consideration as the directors may determine."
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shares for an "improper purpose" cannot be justified. It follows that the
only restraint on the directors' power to issue shares is that they must act
"honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
corporation" in accordance with their fiduciary duty under paragraph
122(1)(a) of the CBCA. However, it is very difficult for a court to
determine the subjective motive or intent behind directors' actions. The
refinement added by Teck that the directors must have reasonable
grounds for their belief removes this problem and places a tactical burden
on the directors to show objective justification for their actions.
Note that the approach in Teck, when applied in a takeover context,
is in basic accordance with the approach applied in the United States
under the Unocal three-prong test. 172 Before Teck, it need only have been
argued that the directors had acted in good faith, thus fulfilling but the
first requirement of the Unocal test. It is suggested that the requirement
in Teck that the directors must have reasonable grounds for their belief is
essentially equivalent to the second and third requirements of the Unocal
test that the directors show reasonable investigation and that any
defensive measure they adopt must be reasonable in relation to the threat
posed.
Another important aspect of the Teck case is the position adopted by
Berger J. that in determining what is in the best interests of the
corporation, directors are entitled to consider interests other than those of
the shareholders. As hestated
The classical theory is that the directors' duty is to the company. The
company's shareholders are the company (Boyd C. in Martin v. Gibson
(1907), 15 O.L.R. 623) and therefore no interests outside those of the
shareholders can legitimately be considered by the directors....
A classical theory that once was unchallengeable must yield to the facts of
modem life. In fact, of course, it has. If today the directors of a company
were to consider the interests of its employees no one would argue that in
doing so they were not acting bona fide in the interests of the company
itself. Similarly, if the directors were to consider the consequences to the
community of any policy that the company intended to pursue, and were
deflected in their commitment to policy as a result, it could not be said that
they had not considered bona fide the interests of the shareholders.173
To hold that directors are entitled to base their decisions upon
consideration of interests in addition to those of shareholders is in
accordance with the very wording of the directors' statutory duty itself.
The CBCA makes it clear that the directors owe their duty to the

172. See supra, at pp. 168-170.
173. Supra, note 163, at 412-13.
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corporation1 74 It is a fundamental principle of corporate law that a
corporation is an entity unto itself, distinct from its shareholders. 175
Therefore, when a corporation receives a take-over bid, the directors are
under a duty to react to that bid in the best interests of the corporation
itself, and not in the best interests of solely the shareholders.
This approach is consistent with that applied in the United State.1 76
However, it must be noted that under the principles developed in that
country, once it is determined that a company is to be sold, only
shareholder concerns are to be considered.1 77 To this extent, the
American position is in accordance with that held by Canadian securities
regulators as pronounced in National Policy No. 38.178 However, it is
suggested that such an approach should not be followed in Canada. No
logical alteration of the directors' duties results simply because an
"auction" for the company is underway. Interests of constituencies other
than shareholders become no less worthy of protection.
If interests of constituencies other than shareholders are to be
considered with respect to a take-over bid, it is only logical that it be the
directors, and not the shareholders, 79 that should be responsible for
making the take-over decision.' 80 Such an approach also recognizes the
duty imposed on directors by subsection 102(1) of the CBCA to "manage
the business and affairs" of the corporation for which they act. As Berger
J. stated in Teck
When a company elects its board of directors and entrusts them with the
power to manage the company, the directors are entitled to manage it....

[T]he shareholders have no right to alter the terms of the directors'

mandate except by amendment of the articles or by replacing the directors

themselves.18'
Similar sentiments have also been recently expressed by the Delaware
Court of Chancery in ParamountCommunications,Inc. v. Time, Inc. 182
The corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors, in
exercising their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow the
174. CBCA, para. 122(1)(a) states that: "Every director... shall act honestly and in good
faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation"(emphasis added).
175. Salomon v. Salomon & Co., Ltd, [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.).
176. See supra at pp. 173.
177. b d
178. See supra,at pp. 180.
179. Shareholders do have the right to decide on issues involving a "fundamental change" to
the corporation. See, CBCA, Part XV, "Fundamental Changes".
180. CBCA, subs. 102(1) provides that "Subject to any unanimous shareholder agreement, the
directors shall manage the business and affairs of a corporation."
181. Supra, note 163, at 430.
182. Fed Sec L Rep., para. 94,514, at 93,264.
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wishes of a majority of shares. In fact, directors, not shareholders, are
charged with the duty to manage the firm. 8 3, 184
Not only should directors be entitled to make the take-over decision,
but obiter in First City FinancialCorp. v. Genstar Corp.185 would appear
to indicate they are obligated to so decide:
The right and indeed the obligation of directors to take steps that they
honestly believe are in the interests of the company and its shareholders in
a take-over contest or in respect of a take-over bid, is perfectly clear and
86
unchallenged.1 ,187
Although directors may be permitted to make the take-over decision,
it is important to note that shareholder interests do not thereby go
unprotected. First, in discharging their statutory duty of loyalty under
paragraph 122(1)(a) of the CBCA, the directors must often regard the
shareholders as the most important of the corporation's constituencies
that are to be considered. Where the interests of the shareholders are not
properly considered, the directors may be held liable. Second,
shareholders also have the right to apply for a remedy under subsection
241(1) of the CBCA where they consider that their interests have been
oppressed, unfairly prejudiced or unfairly disregarded by the directors. 188
Finally, just as the citizens of a democracy have a right to replace their
government where they feel that it has not adequately represented them,
so may the shareholders of a corporation replace its directors. 89
It is left now only to determine the propriety of either the adoption or
maintenance of a shareholder rights plan by a corporation's directors in
light of the above approach to analyzing their duty of loyalty. It was
noted above' 90 that in the United States judicial focus has shifted from an

183. Ibid, at 93,284.
184. Although the Paramount Communications case held that it was acceptable for the

directors of a corporation to enter into a merger transaction, even though that merger was
opposed by a majority of the corporation's shareholders, on the basis that the merger would,
in the directors' opinion, result in a higher long term value of the corporation, comment was
not passed upon the question of whether or not directors of a corporation may refuse to redeem
poison pill rights where they, for whatever reason, conclude that a potential take-over bid is

not in the best interests of the corporation.
185. (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 631 (Ont. H.C.).

186. Ibid, at 646.
187. See also Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858, at 873 (Del. S.C. 1985) where Horsey

J. stated that "In the merger context, a director may not abdicate that duty by leaving to the
shareholder alone the decision to approve or disapprove the agreement."
188. See Subsection IV.2, supra,at pp.
189. CBCA, subs. 106(3) provides for the election of directors by the shareholders. CBCA,

subs. 109(1) provides that "the shareholders of a corporation may by ordinary resolution at a
special meeting remove any director or directors from office."
190. See supra, at pp. 185-187.
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analysis of the adoption of poison pills to an analysis of the operation of
poison pills. Such a shift should also occur in Canada, albeit for different
reasons. The shift in the United States was premised on the grounds that
coercive take-over techniques still abound and that it is therefore always
191
reasonable for a board of directors to adopt a shareholder rights plan.
However, it was shown that Canadian laws nullify the deleterious effects
of most, if not all, coercive take-over techniques.192 The point remains,
however, that in the context of a take-over there are constituencies other
than the shareholders to consider and thus, it is always reasonable for a
board of directors to put in place a mechanism that allows them to screen
any potential take-over bid to determine if such a take-over would or
would not be in the best interests of their corporation.
Where it is determined that no breach of duty arose upon the adoption
of a shareholder rights plan, directors of Canadian corporations clearly
remain under a duty to ensure that all decisions regarding the
maintenance of a poison pill are made in good faith and on reasonable
grounds, with a view to the best interests of the corporation. The only
distinction to be made between the American approach and the suggested
Canadian approach at this point is that the directors of Canadian
corporations should continue to consider the interests of all constituencies
of the corporation, and not just those of the shareholders.
V. Conclusion
The shareholder rights plan has evolved as one of the most effective
mechanisms for preventing or deterring a take-over bid which directors
view as not being in the best interests of their corporation. American
precedent provides a solid foundation upon which a Canadian judicial
and regulatory response to the adoption and maintenance of poison pills
may be formed. However, due to differences in both the take-over
environment and philosophical beliefs regarding market regulation, it is
suggested that a truly Canadian position must be developed.
Canadian securities regulators have taken the same position as have
both the American federal government and courts in stating that the takeover decision is to be made by the shareholders of the target corporation.
Furthermore, it is clear that these regulators have the machinery at their
disposal to enforce their view.
It is suggested that Canadian corporate law principles dictate that the
take-over decision is to be made by the target's directors, acting in good

191. b d
192. See supra,at pp. 176-180.
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faith and on reasonable grounds with a view to the best interests of the
corporation. It is further suggested that in making such a decision,
directors have an obligation to consider the interests of all constituencies
of the corporation and not just those of the shareholders.
To the extent that the views of the Canadian securities regulators
conflict with those of the judiciary in interpreting the above corporate
law principles, it is suggested that the former must give way.

